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Abstract—We propose protocols to resolve the tension be-
tween anonymity and accountability in a peer-to-peer man-
ner. Law enforcement can adopt this approach to solve
crimes involving cryptocurrency and anonymization tech-
niques. We illustrate how the protocols could apply to
Monero rings and CoinJoin transactions in Bitcoin.
1. Introduction
“Anonymity loves company.” [6] It is well estab-
lished that anonymity is co-created by the members of an
anonymity set, who share the same intention and employ
technical systems and protocols to make them appear
indistinguishable to outside observers [16]. In many cases,
the parties retain some private information about the set
formation, which can help deanonymize members of the
set. We explore how the police can gather and use this
information in exceptional cases, pertaining to the age-
long tension between privacy and law enforcement.
Previously, this tension has been studied for mixes
in communication networks [5], [11], [4]. The proposed
solutions rely on putting backdoors into systems or the
supporting cryptography, such that designated parties can
revoke the anonymity in justified cases. Access to the
backdoor is made transparent, which holds law enforce-
ment accountable and impedes mass surveillance.
With the advent of privacy-hardened cryptocurrencies
and their popularity among criminals, the tension is in-
stantiated for money flows. While backdoors seem tech-
nically feasible, it is unlikely that they can be sustained in
decentralized systems, whose raison d’eˆtre is the rejection
of privileged parties with special access rights. Other,
more widely acceptable ideas to combat money launder-
ing specifically are threshold schemes. Small payments
would enjoy unlinkability while larger transactions require
identification or are traceable by design [10], [19]. The
downsides of this approach include the need to agree on
a threshold and, more importantly, it would require strong
identities in order to prevent “smurfing” attacks, which
split a large sum into many small payments.
We explore a different approach. Collaborative
deanonymization means that the parties who formed the
anonymity set, henceforth called witnesses, share infor-
mation on request for the purpose of solving a crime. We
argue that this approach is compatible with the peer-to-
peer spirit of decentralized systems because every witness
decides if she supports the investigation or not. This limits
the method to felonies that are universally disapproved,
such as extortion (ransomware) or the financing of child
sexual abuse. For the method to be effective, it is not re-
quired that every witness collaborates. Every collaborating
witness reduces the search space. Law enforcement might
suspicious
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Figure 1. Example entity graph of 7 ring-type transactions,m = 2. Dots
are entities, arrows denote possible payments. Observe the exponential
growth of suspects (entities on the very left).
leverage a range of incentives to induce collaboration:
alibi, altruism, bounties, and—in justified cases—force
(e. g., seizure and use of a private key). Unlike traffic or
blockchain analyses, collaborative deanonymization does
not scale, hence the risk of secret mass surveillance is
small. Moreover, as search requests are announced pub-
licly, law enforcement can be held accountable. The very
fact that anonymity is conditional can deter crime.
In the following we develop a scenario (Sect. 2),
formulate desiderata, and sketch protocols (Sects. 3 and 4)
that enable collaborative deanonymization of two relevant
privacy techniques: CoinJoin anonymization in Bitcoin,
and Monero rings. Section 5 concludes.
Crucially, our protocols are overlays and do not require
changes to the target systems. Similar protocols can be de-
veloped for other cryptocurrencies and privacy techniques.
2. Scenario and Model
Consider a scenario where a law enforcement agency
(LEA) has identified a suspicious cash-out from a cryp-
tocurrency address. The objective of an investigation is
to find an identifiable source, i.e., backtracking. After
employing known blockchain analysis methods, like state-
of-the-art clustering [8], the LEA obtains an entity graph
where backtracking is ambiguous only due to mixing
transactions.
We model such transactions as collections of m inputs
and n outputs. The LEA has no information about the
relation.1 Without loss of generality, we assume that each
output of a transaction is funded by exactly one input.
Backtracking links the entity associated with the targeted
t-th output to the entity of the funding input. Between
1. Conversely, if the LEA has some information (e. g. due to non-
uniformly valued inputs and outputs), it can partition the transaction
into smaller units and proceed as described.
transactions, each input of a transaction references exactly
one output of a previous transaction.
We consider two of the most relevant types of mixing
transactions: join-type as used in CoinJoin [12] and ring-
type as used in Monero [7].
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Join-type transactions are formed collaboratively by
m parties, potentially facilitated by an intermediary such
as JoinMarket [13]. We model this using m inputs, each
funding a distinct output (n = m). A join-type transaction
can then be expressed as a permutation ψ on {1, . . . ,m}.
The LEA’s problem is to find the funding input ψ(t) of the
t-th output. In practice, CoinJoin transactions vary in size.
A study estimates the modal value of inputs for CoinJoins
on Bitcoin at m = 3 [13]. Transactions with m > 10 are
rare.2
In contrast to join-type transactions, ring-type trans-
actions can be formed without the cooperation of other
entities. Moreover, a ring-type transaction does not spend
all outputs referenced on its input side. In our simplified
model, ring transactions havem inputs and a single output
(n = t = 1). The LEA’s goal is to learn the true
input σ.3 At the time of writing, the Monero reference
implementation fixes the number of inputs to m = 11.
For both types of mixing transactions, the anonymity
of the participants is based on the observer’s uncertainty
about ψ and σ, respectively. If multiple mixing transac-
tions are cascaded, the number of possible funding sources
(suspects) increases exponentially in the number of layers
(see Figure 1). We propose protocols that allow the LEA
to reduce the number of suspects in collaboration with a
subset of the involved parties.
3. Collaborative Backtracking
We assume an authenticated one-way communication
channel from the LEA to the protocol participants. The
LEA uses this channel to announce inquiries on targeted
transaction outputs. Each inquiry conveys enough infor-
mation so that a potential witness can decide whether she
supports the request, i. e., whether she approves prosecu-
tion of the specific case, or not.
We further assume an unauthenticated but confidential
communication channel from the witnesses to the LEA
and, for group testimonies, communication channels be-
tween the witnesses. Witnesses willing to support an in-
quiry use these channels to give testimonies that facilitate
backtracking for a single transaction.
2. A single CoinJoin transaction with
m = 100 made headlines in June 2019:
https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-users-perform-what-might-be-the-largest-coinjoin-ever.
3. Note that we depart from the terminology of the Monero project,
which calls an entire ring “input.”
3.1. Individual Testimony
An individual testimony is a protocol between a single
witness and the LEA. It results in ruling out one of the
possible inputs. Formally speaking, the witness associated
with the i-th input should prove that ψ(t) 6= i or σ 6= i,
respectively.
For join-type transactions, the witness can testify by
signing a challenge with the private keys belonging to the
i-th input and the j-th output (obviously t 6= j).
Ring-type transactions hide the true input using trace-
able ring signatures [7]. By design, these ring signatures
reveal attempts to spend an input more than once. The
spending of an input yields a transaction-independent
key image that must be included in a valid signature—
transactions attempting to spend the same input will
contain identical key images [17]. Let o be the output
of a preceding transaction that links the witness to the
suspicious transaction T . The witness prepares a phantom
transaction T ′ for the LEA. It has one input referencing
o and one output. The output could be invalid in order to
avoid accidental inclusion in the blockchain. For example,
T ′ could spend more funds than available in o. Crucially,
the phantom transaction unambiguously spends o. If the
key image associated with T ′ is different to the key image
of T , it must hold that i 6= σ.
3.2. Group Testimony
The LEA learns one true input to output relationship
per individual testimony. Since the LEA is only interested
in the true input of a single output, all individual testi-
monies reveal more information than necessary. Group
testimonies offer a way to overcome the unnecessary
privacy loss. Multiple witnesses controlling the set of
inputs S collaboratively testify ψ(t) 6∈ S or σ 6∈ S, while
maintaining their anonymity within S.
For join-type transactions, this can be realized by
signing a challenge with all 2 · |S| private keys belonging
to the witnesses’ inputs and outputs. In the best case, all
m − 1 witnesses cooperate (S = {1, . . . ,m} \ {t}) and
identify the true suspect. If |S| < m witnesses partic-
ipate in the protocol, for example because private keys
are deleted or witnesses unreachable, the search space is
reduced to m− |S| suspects. Join-type group testimonies
retain S as the anonymity set of witnesses. Cases where
S = {1, . . . ,m} \ {t} minimize the anonymity loss for
witnesses when testifying that ψ(t) /∈ S.
For ring-type transactions, it is possible to implement
group testimonies with the construction of a provably
spent set [18], [20]. For example, each cooperating witness
can individually form a new transaction T ′ like for an in-
dividual testimony, however this time referencing not only
its own input but all inputs S of cooperating witnesses.
Given |S| transactions that all have the same set of inputs
S and yet differing key images, the LEA gains evidence
that σ 6∈ S. If an output o referenced by an input i ∈ S is
unspent at the time of the testimony, the respective witness
can achieve an anonymity set of S for o by referencing
all S when spending o. Conversely, if o has already been
spent in a transaction T ′′ with input set S′′, the anonymity
set of the witness reduces to S ∩ S′′.
Notably, each of the cooperative protocols can be
executed jointly for multiple mixing transactions. This
testifies that the owners of S (now generalized to the enu-
meration of all inputs in all transactions involved) initiated
none of these transactions. This approach is especially
interesting for ring-type transactions, as larger S increase
the overlap with the anonymity sets of outputs that have
already been spent elsewhere.
3.3. Dealing with the Risk of False Testimonies
A general question is how much confidence the LEA
can place in the testimonies. This calls for a closer look
at how collaborative deanonymization can fail, and in
the worst case produce false or misleading evidence. We
observe crucial differences between join-type and ring-
type transactions.
Monero stores σ on the blockchain, however in en-
crypted form. This should reduce the risk of false testi-
monies to the security of the cryptography used, even if
private keys are leaked or stolen.
By contrast, CoinJoin does not commit ψ to the
blockchain. Even computationally unbounded observers
cannot decide about the relation. The resulting deniability
bears a risk of false testimonies. For example, if the
perpetrator has access to the private keys of a witness,
he could obtain a false alibi by signing a false input–
output relation. If the victim among the witnesses does
not participate in the collaborative deanonymization, she is
falsely accused. If she does participate, the LEA receives
two conflicting statements. This concentrates the suspicion
on both the perpetrator and the victim, hence perpetrators
have little to gain from false statements—unless their
victims are unavailable.
The sketched situation highlights that parties engaging
in CoinJoins might be exposed to physical risks under
collaborative deanonymization. A potential direction of
research is to modify the protocols used for CoinJoin
formation in such a way that ψ is committed to the
blockchain at the time of the transaction. This would
obviate false accusations and reduce the incentives to
attack other witnesses. The key problem to solve is to
decide under which conditions what part of ψ should
be revealable. For example, should every party commit
to one relation individually? Would a threshold scheme
make sense? Moreover, it would be desirable to make the
commitment coercion-resistant. Otherwise the risk could
reappear at the time of the CoinJoin formation, rather than
be mitigated.
A general consequence of collaborative deanonymiza-
tion is that old private keys remain sensitive even if they
do not control any funds anymore.
4. Forward Tracking
A variant of the scenario presented in Section 2 is
foward tracking. Here, the LEA has identified a suspicious
origin and wishes to trace the money flow to its (current)
destination or until it hits a known cash-out point. We
sketch how our approach can be adapted to this case.
4.1. Testimonies for Forward Tracking
Due to the symmetry of join-type transactions, the
testimony protocols for the backtracking case (Sect. 3) can
be repurposed for forward tracking. Since ψ is bijective,
testimonies which rule out assignments of ψ also rule out
assignments of ψ−1.
Ring-type transactions are less straightforward. The
protocols given in Section 3 enable collaborating wit-
nesses to testify that a set of inputs S does not contain
the funding input for a given transaction T , i.e., σ /∈ S.
For the case of forward tracking, they must instead prove
that only one specific suspicious input s is not a funding
input, i.e., σ 6= s. Individual witnesses can accomplish
this by creating a phantom transaction T ′, which include
all but the suspicious input s. As T ′ and T share the same
funding input i, they will produce identical key images.
By comparing the key images of T and T ′, the LEA can
verify that σ 6= s without learning i.
4.2. Blacklisting and Cover Transactions
Forward tracking is related to transaction blacklisting
previously proposed (and controversially debated) as a
regulatory instrument [15], [2]. Specifically the “poison”
policy [14], where taint of a single input is propagated
to all outputs, mimics the proliferation of a priori sus-
picion. An interesting question is whether the threat of
blacklisting can foster collaboration. For example, the
propagation policy could terminate at transactions that are
whitelisted after sufficient evidence has been collected to
disambiguate the entity graph (for forward and backtrack-
ing).
Forward tracking on Monero rings comes with two
caveats. First, it might be hard to decide about when to
terminate (unsuccessfully), because it is often unknown
whether a given output has been spent at all. Second, the
method is susceptible to cover transactions placed by a
perpetrator. Such transactions reference the investigated
money flow in order to increase the search space and with
it the number of witnesses needed.
Blacklisting might be a defense against this behavior
because it would devalue the funds in cover transactions
and thus raise the cost of creating them. However, the
effectiveness of this method as well as other defenses
are open research questions. We note that backtracking
is not affected by the threat of cover transactions because
funding transactions cannot be added after the spending
transaction.
5. Conclusion and Outlook
We have presented a novel way to investigate criminal
money flows in cryptocurrencies even if the perpetrators
use anonymization techniques. Our approach requires col-
laboration of witnesses, which keeps the method costly
enough to prevent mass surveillance or the prosecution
of petty crimes. Specifically, we have given protocols for
backtracking and forward tracking of CoinJoin transac-
tions in Bitcoin as well as Monero rings. Several tech-
niques ensure that the information shared with law en-
forcement can be limited to the necessary minimum. Fi-
nally, we have discussed new risks due to false accusations
and pointed out relations to transaction blacklisting.
We shall also pinpoint future work. Obviously, the
protocols for secure testimonies need to be further devel-
oped and their properties formalized and proven. A proof-
of-concept implementation for the most relevant types
of mixing transactions could demonstrate the practicality
of our approach. Whether and under which condition
LEAs can deploy collaborative deanonymization must be
subject of more interdisciplinary work with legal scholars.
Adapting the approach to less common types of mix-
ing transactions (see for instance Table 1 of [9] for an
overview) would help to complete the picture.
The topic also lends itself to economic studies. It
would be interesting to investigate the incentives of wit-
nesses to collaborate, presumably with cooperative game
theory [3]. In addition, potential knock-on effects on the
participation in mixing transactions call for model in the
tradition of competitive game theory [1].
Two broader technical directions are to explore col-
laborative deanonymization for anonymous communica-
tion systems, and to research deniable privacy techniques,
which could protect potential witnesses from any pressure
to testify or release deanonymizing information.
In summary, collaborative deanonymization appears
not only under-researched, but also under-estimated for
its potential to balance the conflicting goals of privacy
and law enforcement in future digital currency systems.
This paper set out to make a case for this promising tool.
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